4 John Lewis Gaddis, "In Defense of Limited Generalizations: Rewriting Cold War History and Rethinking International Political Theory," in Colin Ellman and Miriam Fendias Ellman (eds.) (translated by Akio Watanabe, translated by Akio Miyashita, Kazuhiko Noguchi, Minae Toya, and Yasutomo Tanaka), Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Dialogues between History and Politics (University of Tokyo Press, 2003), p. 199. 5 John J. Mearsheimer (translated by Shinji Okuyama), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Satsuki Shobo Shinsha, 2021), p. 41. See 2003). However, the most persuasive reason for historians' distrust of theory is that we sense a Catch-22 lurking in it (an absurd military discipline that leads to a situation where one cannot do anything but the other, as described in the American play and novel of the same name). Theorists try to construct general theories that are universally applicable for simple events. But if these events become complex, the general theories are no longer universally applicable. Thus, from our perspective, when a theory is correct, it merely proves something that is fairly obvious. If we try to say more than what is obvious, the theory is usually wrong. Historians take a completely different approach: they create narratives to reconstruct complex events. In doing so, we make generalizations and also undermine them. Life is complicated, and so is history.4 Politics is driven by human beings. And it is extremely difficult to unravel all the principles of action for all human beings. Therefore, it is equally extremely difficult to explain the factors that cause a political event with a theory that applies across time and regions. On the other hand, theoretical research is not without merit. For example, one important theory in international politics is offensive realism. This theory posits that states attempt to maximize their power in order to ensure their own security. This is because power is relative, and since it is not known how much power, or more specifically, military power, a nation needs to ensure its own security, it is rational for it to maximize its own power. This offensive realism is universal across time and regions, but on the other hand, it cannot explain all the events in real international politics. In response to this point, John J. Mearsheimer, an international political scientist who advocates offensive realism, argues that offensive realism is like a powerful flashlight that illuminates a dark room. Although it cannot illuminate every corner of the room, it is still very useful in helping us navigate the darkness.5 In other words, if a large theory like offensive realism is like a giant flashlight, then a historical narrative is like a small light that illuminates the parts that it cannot illuminate by itself. There is no superiority or inferiority between a large light and a small light, and by utilizing both, it is possible to illuminate the dark room of international politics as much as possible. In this respect, the uniqueness of Japanese international political science can be utilized. In other words, in Japan, theoretical and statistical research as well as historical research are lumped together as international politics, so they can effectively complement each other's shortcomings. For example, if we take Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an example, offensive realism can explain many of Russia's actions. This is because occupying Ukraine would enable it to become a bulwark against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, on the other hand, a big theory such as offensive realism alone cannot explain why the invasion began in the way that it did on February 24, 2022. In such cases, historical research that emphasizes the role of individuals is useful. As Welch argues, if Yeltsin or Gorbachev were the current leaders of Russia, it is unlikely that they would have invaded Ukraine in the way that they did on February 24, 2022. Therefore, it is important to focus on the nature and thoughts of the individual Putin. In this way, theoretical and statistical research and historical research each have their own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, neither method is superior or inferior, and it is important to flexibly combine analytical methods depending on the case being analyzed. It can also be pointed out that the unique characteristics of Japanese international politics are useful in this respect. Finally, I would like to touch upon the usefulness of history itself. Does objective history exist, and is this the end of history?
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